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Abstract
This article adapts and develops the idea of a cynical or ‘stealth’ understanding of politics to 
explore how citizens’ estrangement from formal politics is processed cognitively through a 
populist lens. Earlier work has shown the widespread presence of stealth attitudes in the United 
States and Finland. We show that stealth attitudes are also well established in Britain, demonstrate 
their populist character and reveal that age, newspaper readership and concerns about governing 
practices help predict their adoption by individuals. Yet our survey findings also reveal a larger 
body of positive attitudes towards the practice of democracy suggesting that there is scope for 
challenging populist cynicism. We explore these so-called ‘sunshine’ attitudes and connect them to 
the reform options favoured by British citizens. If we are to challenge populist negativity towards 
politics, we conclude that improving the operation of representative politics is more important 
than offering citizens new forms of more deliberative participation.
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Introduction
Evidence of mounting negativity towards politics in established democracies predates the 
economic downturn prompted by the global financial crisis – and it is likely to prove 
more enduring (Dalton, 2004; Hay, 2007; Norris, 2011; Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Stoker, 
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2006; Torcal and Montero, 2006). To contribute meaningfully to the debate about disen-
chantment with the practice of politics and what might be done to alleviate it, political 
scientists need to provide answers to three questions: What is the form and structure of 
popular disenchantment? What is the extent of the stranglehold that it now exerts on the 
body politic? And what reform mechanisms might help to promote a more positive 
engagement with politics by citizens?
Drawing on evidence from the United Kingdom set in a broader comparative context, 
this article tries to answer all three questions. We use established, yet innovative, survey 
measures tested in several countries to explore what British citizens think about politics 
and how it should work. We add additional evidence from focus groups in which citizens 
were given the opportunity to explore and propose reform measures that might improve 
politics, and we test those ideas in the context of a wider and more representative sample 
of British citizens.
In answer to the first question, we argue that the expression of what irks many citizens 
about politics takes a modern populist form that we label ‘stealth populism’. We draw 
on the idea of stealth democracy originally proposed by John Hibbing and Elizabeth 
Theiss-Morse (2002) but reframe the understanding of stealth attitudes. These we see less 
as the expression of a commitment to a particular and preferred vision of democracy and 
more as an expression of populist angst about the current practice of politics. Stealth 
populists think that in a democracy, the political system should deliver what the people 
want without them having to pay continual attention to it. From such a perspective, the 
perceived failings of the current political system are a simple product of too much poli-
ticking. Politicians talk rather than act, make too many compromises to special interests 
and do not have sufficient cognisance of expertise to come to sensible decisions. Both the 
construction of expressed negativity towards politics and its drivers support our argument 
that stealth populism is a perspective with a populist character and origins.
Our response to the second question about the depth of stealth populism is to argue that 
its grip is strong, but far from unbreakable. Public attitudes towards institutions such as 
the political system, which are rarely at the forefront of their attention, are always layered, 
regularly ambivalent and sometimes loosely formed. In particular, although citizens may 
well hold stealth values, they typically do so alongside other more positive views about 
the operation of democratic politics and the potential role they might have in it (Neblo 
et al., 2010a). Our empirical evidence confirms the presence of these more positive under-
standings. We label them, following the work of Neblo et al. (2010a), ‘sunshine’ views of 
democratic politics. Their presence indicates an enduring capacity of citizens to see poli-
tics as operating in a manner close to long-established and familiar principles of liberal 
representative democracy. But, in contrast to Michael Neblo et al. and Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse, we do not see ‘stealth’ and ‘sunshine’ views as mutually exclusive, such that evi-
dence of one might disconfirm the presence of the other. Rather, we see them as alternative 
understandings (pre-formed vernaculars, in effect) in and through which citizens make 
sense of different (and/or ambivalent) political cues (and which are typically triggered by 
those cues). Citizens, we suggest, have the capacity to view the politics they witness in 
more optimistic or more pessimistic terms. The key question is how our politics might be 
reformed so as more consistently to trigger or cue their more optimistic disposition (or, 
indeed, to lead them to resolve the ambiguity or ambivalence inherent in many political 
cues in a more forgiving way).
The final contribution of the article tackles this directly, by considering what might be 
done to reform our politics. What kind of political reforms would incline citizens more to 
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express a ‘sunshine’ disposition as opposed to passing an increasingly stealthy populist 
and cynical judgement of contemporary democratic practice? Our approach is to ask citi-
zens themselves about their reform preferences by giving them the opportunity to reflect 
and deliberate collectively on the question. Using focus groups alongside new survey 
evidence, we show that the reforms most favoured by British citizens are about restoring 
representative politics rather than necessarily grabbing new opportunities for participa-
tion. Populist negativity towards politics might be challenged so that stealth populism 
could be trumped by popular endorsement of the nuanced practice of liberal representa-
tive democracy providing that the behaviour of politicians changed and the context of the 
exchange between representatives and citizens was less dominated by spin and playing to 
the media gallery.
The article begins with a review of the scope and limitations of our various data 
sources. Thereafter, we connect stealth attitudes to our understanding of populist nega-
tivity. We then test that connection empirically using original survey data from 2011/2012 
before exploring the presence of more positive sunshine attitudes using the same data set. 
Finally, we report on citizens’ reform preferences using material from focus groups con-
ducted in 2011/2012 and additional survey work conducted late in 2012.
Populist Angst in Contemporary Democracy: Beyond 
Stealth versus Sunshine Views
Most contemporary commentators agree that, at its core, populism is an anti-phenomenon 
(Mény and Surel, 2002; Mudde, 2004).1 It relies on the distinction between a pure and 
sovereign people, on the one hand, and a corrupt political elite on the other – and, of course, 
the (moral) supremacy of the former over the latter. A further distinction can be drawn 
between populism as a zeitgeist, a way of thinking about contemporary politics (Mair, 
2005; Mudde, 2004), and populism as a political movement or form of political mobilisa-
tion (whether of right or left) (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008; Deiwiks, 2009; Taggart, 
2002). In what follows, we focus on populism as a set of ideas that is prevalent in the 
judgement of contemporary democracies by citizens. The challenge is to find a way of 
encapsulating and measuring this populist zeitgeist.
The literature on populism helps us towards a deeper understanding of the phenome-
non. The rise of populism as a prevalent framing for contemporary politics rests on an 
ambiguity at the heart of democracy, as Margaret Canovan (1999) explains. Populism is 
a bi-product of the interplay between the ‘two faces of democracy’, one ‘redemptive’, the 
other ‘pragmatic’. The former views democracy ‘as rule by the people’. Accordingly, it 
regards politics as legitimate when it delivers unambiguously ‘what the people want’. By 
contrast, the latter more pragmatic view is more focussed on the compromises, deals and 
institutional devices that enable different interests to be reconciled without resort to vio-
lence. Regular failures to deliver on the redemptive vision and the murky realities of 
pragmatic democratic politics provide the breeding ground for populist attitudes. The 
palpable tension between these two understandings provides the space in which populism 
flourishes. Populism picks at the gap between a democracy seen through the narrow lens 
of rule by the people and that seen through the image of the complexities of liberal demo-
cratic governance.
Trends in the long-term conduct of politics in contemporary democracies (includ-
ing ostensibly benign processes such as the rise of multiculturalism) have arguably 
made the gap between rule by the people and liberal representative politics loom 
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larger. The increased professionalisation of politics has created a fertile breeding ground 
for ‘us’ versus ‘them’ populist stealth angst. As Peter Mair (2005) puts it, ‘traditional 
politics is seen less and less as something that belongs to the citizens or to the society, 
and is instead seen as something that is done by politicians’ (p. 20). Parties, lobbyists, 
think tankers and political advisors are professionals and they operate increasingly 
within their own world of rules and norms divorced from standards of pecuniary and 
discursive honesty favoured by citizens in general (Allen and Birch, 2014).
Moreover, the breakdown of traditional political platforms has encouraged political 
elites to adopt populist rhetoric to counter these trends and to take up, at times, anti-
political stances themselves. It is elites rather than citizens that have led debates about the 
‘democratic deficit’ in the European Union and politicians have not been slow to run 
negative campaigns and accuse their opponents of incompetence, dishonesty, sleaze or 
corruption; moreover, it is again political elites who have led the move to the sub-con-
tracting of their decision-making powers to unelected experts such as independent central 
banks (Hay, 2007). These practices have effects. As Cas Mudde (2004) comments, ‘after 
years of reading and hearing about dysfunctional national and supranational democracies, 
more and more people have become both sensitised to the problem, and convinced that 
things can and should be better’ (p. 562).
Another trend credibly reinforcing the proliferation of populist attitudes is the ‘mediati-
sation’ of politics and the role of tabloid coverage in promoting a populist negativity towards 
politics – in effect, a populist anti-politics which pits the people (and ‘the will of the peo-
ple’) against those who claim to represent them. The core role of the media in presenting 
contemporary politics is widely acknowledged (Mair, 2005; Street, 2011). Moreover, our 
own work shows it to be widely understood by citizens themselves (Stoker et al., in press). 
As Gianpietro Mazzoleni (2008) notes, ‘if we examine the processes of media-driven rep-
resentation and the symbolic construction of favourable opinion climates … we find a 
significant degree of support for the rise of populist phenomena’ (p. 50). The impact of the 
media is complex in that mainstream media can play a crucial role in challenging populism 
and certainly in scrutinising populist political movements. The breeding ground for populist 
sentiment is, then, more likely to come from the tabloid or popular news media – and they 
have often been keen to present themselves in precisely such terms. Under commercial (or, 
indeed, proprietorial) pressure to maximise audience figures, such media sources typically 
present what is regarded as a simplified (more pejoratively, ‘dumbed down’) version of 
the news and perhaps also a more sensational and sensationalised view of what the ‘news’ 
is (Crick, 2005). The result is a characteristic tendency towards sensationalist accounts 
focussed on scandals and personalities, presenting complex problems in terms of stark 
choices (Mazzoleni, 2008). Such news media typically present themselves as guardians and 
guarantors of the people’s interest in a context in which such interests are in danger of being 
thwarted by political elites and the machinations of political power.
The economic downturn experienced by many contemporary democracies and scan-
dals over politicians’ expenses or allegations of corruption have added to the negative 
mood music surrounding our politics. But it is the longer term factors identified above in 
the construction and reportage of politics that provide the bedrock to populist angst about 
democratic practice. The evidence of political disenchantment points to its considerable 
and sustained presence prior to the crisis, both in the United Kingdom (Hay, 2007; Stoker, 
2006) and beyond (Dalton, 2004; Pharr and Putnam, 2000).
Our argument is that a populist vernacular about politics has been consolidated over 
recent years, sourcing the negative commentary on its practices with a repertoire of 
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discursive resources and an array of florid images and allusions. This picks at the gap 
between the ideal of ‘rule by the people’ and the complexities of modern representative 
politics. But how can that gap in public attitudes be operationlised and measured? Our 
solution is to turn to the debate about two putative and contrasting visions of democracy, 
labelled ‘stealth’ and ‘sunshine’ perspectives by their advocates. The stealth view cap-
tures (as it characterises) the populist angst at the failure to deliver rule by the people and 
the sunshine view similarly seeks to capture (and characterise) citizens’ comprehension 
of the nuanced practices of liberal democracy. In what follows, we develop concepts 
originally developed for other purposes into frameworks for demonstrating the extent of 
populist angst in contemporary democracies and the reserve pool of public understanding 
of the intricacies of democracy.
The stealth framing was originally devised by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) as an 
attempt to refute empirically the expectations of some normative democratic theorists 
who emphasised the importance of citizen participation to effective democracy. As such, 
their work makes them the present-day inheritors of the perspective on democracy so 
powerfully articulated, in its modern form, by Joseph Schumpeter (1942). This perspec-
tive argues that most citizens want to ensure the protection of their interests and rights, yet 
wish also to be disengaged from daily politics, as voting gives them the crucial power to 
select their leaders. The critics of the stealth model, most prominently Neblo et al. (2010a), 
use their own empirical work to rework the case for seeing unconditional participation as 
central to democracy. They seek to show that citizens exhibit a more positive orientation 
to the political engagement available to them. This they summarise as a ‘sunshine’ 
attitude to democratic practice, an understanding that recognises both the opportunities 
afforded by contemporary democracy and its complexities.
As the above discussion suggests, the debate between proponents of the stealth and 
sunshine theses replays, in a more contemporary context, a long-established debate, both 
empirical and normative, between elite and participative understandings of democracy 
(Held, 2006). Our aim is to move the debate on, by seeing stealth and sunshine perspec-
tive not as mutually exclusive but as contending vernaculars in and through which citi-
zens might and do make sense of different political experiences. The stealth perspective, 
we contend, represents less a theory of elite democracy and more a populist expression of 
angst, a framework in and through which to rail against the perceived failing of demo-
cratic politics. The sunshine perspective represents the other side of the democratic gap 
picked at by populism, a more nuanced understanding of the nature and limits of liberal 
representative democracy. Most citizens, we suggest, retain the capacity to understand 
and make sense of the politics they experience in and through either system of thinking. 
As such, the presence of one cannot be taken as evidence of the absence of the other. 
Similarly, evidence of the presence of both cannot be taken as indicative of irrationality 
in citizens’ understandings of politics.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) frame their discussion within the context of a strong 
awareness of popular understandings of the ills of contemporary democracy. Yet they use 
the term populism, as they put it, ‘loosely, to refer to those who want to give the people 
more power’ (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 52). This rather perverse definition of 
populism (in contrast to the theoretical landscape laid out above) blinds them to the rather 
obvious populist features of the stealth democracy that they argue most (US) citizens 
want. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s starting point is that most citizens do not want to 
engage in the detail of politics in part because they assume that most people agree with 
them and in part because they dislike debate and messy compromise. Politics, for them, 
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should be about getting on with delivering what the people want. Politicians should do 
what they say and get on with the task of governing – quietly, effectively and efficiently. 
Yet, politics too often appears to be failing, dominated as it is by self-serving politicians, 
lobbyists and the dark arts of politicking and spin. Frustration with the political elite is 
such that experts or business leaders might be seen to be more likely to do better in deliv-
ering good government.
Our argument is that stealth attitudes among citizens need to be seen as an expression 
of a widespread and embedded populist understanding of politics in mature democracies. 
The stealth perspective gets its leverage from a populist understanding of the gap between 
how politics should be and how it is perceived to be. We would, accordingly, expect the 
drivers of stealth attitudes to reflect its populist character. As such, stealth attitudes might 
have a broader but nonetheless shared constituency with the most strongly mobilised form 
of populism in contemporary UK politics – that expressed by the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP) (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). This has consistently been shown to attract support 
from those who are disproportionately male, of lower social status and from older age 
groups. We suspect that the stealth perspective is, in comparison with UKIP support, likely 
to attract support from individuals from across a broader social spectrum. But we suspect 
also that some of the demographic factors noted above may be in play, a proposition we 
test directly in what follows. Supporters of stealth populism are more likely to be users of 
populist media coverage of politics than those who follow politics through the more 
nuanced coverage from more detailed broadsheet media. In terms of their orientation 
towards politics, we would envisage that its supporters would declare themselves less 
interested in politics, resistant to greater involvement in politics but confident enough in 
their own capacities to support a greater direct say for themselves over key issues. Those 
disproportionately inclined to express a stealth disposition do not see themselves as inca-
pable citizens but as citizens frustrated by the failure of the political system to deliver. 
These citizens may not be deeply interested in politics, but they do fear that the governing 
system is failing and they are likely to stand out in expressing that concern.
The sunshine perspective, in contrast, embraces much more closely a textbook ver-
sion of liberal representative politics and its (legitimate) limits (Neblo et al., 2010a: 572, 
fn 18). It sees value in debate and deliberation and recognises the need to look for com-
promise. Accountable elected politicians need to be at the heart of decision-making in 
order for government to be legitimate. Whereas the stealth-oriented citizen will engage 
with politics only under sufferance (and in order to hold those in office in check), the 
sunshine-oriented citizen is a more willing participant as long as the political world cor-
responds sufficiently to the ideal of a level-playing field (see also Stoker et al., in press). 
From the stealth perspective, politics is about achieving efficiency in collective action; 
from the sunshine perspective, it is about reconciling competing values. Advice from 
business and other experts in making public decisions has its place in this latter world, 
but the key role remains with elected politicians who need to have the final say (and bear 
the ultimate responsibility). As this suggests, both perspectives are as much normative 
as they are empirical.
Neblo et al. (2010a) argue that the sunshine perspective items tap into an idealised 
sense of what democracy could be: ‘how they [citizens] think representative democracy 
should work in principle’ (p. 573). In contrast to the realist, negative judgement about 
politics captured by the stealth perspective, the constituency for this conventional and 
positive narrative about what democracy could be about should be greater than that for 
the stealth view. Sunshine captures a default understanding based on long-standing civic 
Stoker and Hay 7
culture norms. As such, we might expect that the factors driving its support will not be as 
distinctive as those driving the more populist, angst-ridden stealth understanding.
We argue that this framing of stealth views as, at the same time, eroding but existing 
alongside the bedrock of sunshine perspectives is helpful when trying to understand the 
dilemmas of contemporary democracies. The issue is not which form of democracy citi-
zens prefer, but rather why so many citizens find the practice of contemporary politics so 
consistently disappointing and alienating. Stealth views capture an expression of a classic 
populist anxiety about the gap between democracy as redemptive popular sovereignty 
and its rather more prosaic and pragmatic contemporary practice that in turn finds ideal-
ised expression in the sunshine perspective.
Research Design: Data Collection and Methods
The research we report was conducted in partnership with the Hansard Society, a non-
partisan think tank based in London that focuses on issues of democratic politics and 
engagement. The Hansard Society has used annual face-to-face surveys to conduct an 
audit of political engagement in Britain since 2003. In 2011/2012, our research team was 
able to add questions to their audit survey on stealth and sunshine attitudes, replicating 
the questions posed in the earlier studies. The survey was conducted through face-to-face 
interviews with a representative quota sample of 2454 adults aged 16 or above living in 
Great Britain, conducted by Taylor Nelson Sofres-British Market Research Bureau (TNS-
BMRB). The interviews took place in two waves (first wave: 7–13 December 2011, 1193 
respondents; second wave: 11–15 January 2012, 1261 respondents) and were carried out 
in respondents’ homes.
We had the advantage of using an already established and robust survey and working 
with an established survey instrument at relatively modest cost. Yet, we were also using a 
survey designed for a broader general purpose and a rather different overall focus. 
Appending additional questions to an existing survey also meant that compromises had to 
be made about the way questions were asked because of a desire not to overstretch the 
time involved in undertaking the survey for respondents. For example, the questions 
about stealth and sunshine attitudes were asked randomly to a sample of half the respond-
ents in each wave, providing a substantial (1000+) sample for each analysis but leaving 
us unable to test, for example, responses from citizens who were strong supporters of both 
stealth and sunshine orientations. There were also limits to the range of questions that 
could be asked that could have provided useful independent variables. The survey is rich 
in its questions and potential insights but some variables which might credibly help 
explain stealth or sunshine attitudes were not incorporated. These include details of 
respondents’ educational attainment, attitudes to conflict avoidance and the strength of 
partisan commitments. These missing variables limit what we claim from our survey 
results but do not undermine its capacity to support our reframing of the stealth arguments 
through a populist lens, as we shall demonstrate.
So far we have talked about stealth and sunshine in conceptual terms but not in terms of 
how they might be gauged and measured. To capture stealth attitudes requires the use of 
innovative survey questions designed and first deployed by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
(2002) in a representative sample survey in the United States in 1998. That work was rep-
licated by Neblo et al. (2010a) in the United States; these authors also devised and deployed 
an additional set of sunshine questions in the same study. Åsa Bengtsson and Mikko 
Mattila (2009) redeployed the same stealth questions in Finland. Paul Webb (2013) 
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replicated both stealth and sunshine questions for Britain. Evans et al. (2013) did the same 
for Australia, while Hilde Coffé and Ank Michels (2014) have used the stealth measures in 
a study in the Netherlands. In sum, the survey instruments that are key to measuring stealth 
and sunshine are relatively new but have been successfully used in a range of countries.
Stealth attitudes were identified by gauging respondents’ support for the following 
four statements.
1. Elected politicians would help the country more if they would stop talking and 
just take action on important problems.2
2. What people call ‘compromise’ in politics is really just selling out one’s 
principles.
3. Our government would run better if decisions were left to successful business 
people.
4. Our government would run better if decisions were left to non-elected, independ-
ent experts rather than politicians or the people.
However, following the suggestion of Neblo et al. (2010b), we offered six responses: 
‘strongly agree’, ‘tend to agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘tend to disagree’, ‘strongly 
disagree’ and ‘don’t know’.
The sunshine questions were asked in the two tranches of the 2011/2012 survey to half 
of the respondents on a random basis. The questions directly replicated those pioneered 
by Neblo et al. (2010a). Respondents were asked to give one of six responses (strongly 
agree/tend to agree/neither agree or disagree/tend to disagree/strongly disagree/ do not 
know) to four statements.
1. Openness to other people’s views and willingness to compromise are important 
for politics in a country like ours.3
2. It is important for elected politicians to discuss and debate things thoroughly 
before making major policy changes.4
3. In a democracy like ours, there are some important differences between how gov-
ernment should be run and how a business should be managed.
4. It is important for the people and their elected representatives to have the final say 
in running government, rather than leaving it up to unelected experts.
The design of survey questions is a challenging endeavour. Following others, we 
offered closed rather than open-ended questions for practical reasons of survey adminis-
tration and in order to minimise the demands on respondents. Because we offered the 
option of ‘don’t know’ and ‘neither agree nor disagree’ (in contrast to Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse), we hoped to avoid creating forced choices for respondents. But we recognise that 
there is a considerable debate about the advantages or not of this option (Pastek and 
Krosnick, 2010). Yet the core criteria for good survey design were met unambiguously in 
the sense that the questions asked were relatively easy to answer and they followed con-
versational conventions, thereby avoiding the potential for misunderstanding (Pastek and 
Krosnick, 2010).
This said, both the stealth and sunshine battery of questions are, even in the view of 
their respective designers, far from perfect (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 143–144; 
Neblo et al., 2010b: 34–43). Yet ultimately both sets of authors claim, convincingly in 
our view, that the questions they pose capture core attributes of stealth and sunshine 
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perspectives. Indeed, arguably, and crucially when it comes to our own methodological 
choices, these studies – in and through the questions they pose – essentially serve to 
define stealth and sunshine perspective empirically. As such, if our findings are to be 
comparable with those of existing studies, we need to use the same formulation of words. 
But there are undoubtedly methodological issues here that need addressing.
Neblo et al. (2010b: 34) note that a key motivation for formulating the sunshine items 
in the way they do is to counteract the fear of acquiescence bias. Arguably, the best evi-
dence that they achieved this is their finding, which our own analysis confirms, that the 
two sets of survey questions prompted rather different patterns of response and, crucially, 
have very different correlates (see also Evans et al., 2013; Webb, 2013). Reinforcing this 
impression is a further observation – namely, that logistic regression modelling of each of 
the stealth and sunshine questions separately reveals common determinants for each of 
the stealth questions and common, but different, determinants for each of the sunshine 
questions. As Figure 1 shows, stealth and sunshine do not share the same drivers, with the 
exception that both correlate with a tendency to support greater use of direct democratic 
devices. The stealth and sunshine questions are capturing something more than people 
trying to be agreeable.
That said, the stealth and sunshine questions are related in the sense that the sunshine 
questions are set up, in effect, as a mirror opposite to the original stealth items. So it is 
interesting to note that in some surveys, such as those administered by Neblo et al. 
(2010a, 2010b) in which both tranches of questions were posed to the same respondents, 
it is clear that many individuals who were supporters of a stealth view were also support-
ers of a sunshine view. This does not surprise us, for reasons already alluded to. The 
explanation offered by Neblo et al. (2010b: 40–43) is that respondents ostensibly agree-
ing with stealth propositions are passing a judgement on ‘actually existing’ political 
systems, while their support for sunshine responses reflected a more idealised aspiration 
or ideal (in effect, a view of how politics should be). This, we feel, is unconvincing and 
reads too much like an attempt to explain away and rationalise a seeming paradox – a 
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
tabloid readers only
local or other newspaper reader
supports direct democracy
aged 35-54
tabloid and broadsheet reader
aged 55 and above
no print media readership
female
agrees parliament holds government to account
agrees governing system does not works well
little interest in politics
involvement in politics
agrees media influences politicians' debate
want involvement in decision-making
agrees parliament debates matter predicted probability sunshine
predicted probability stealth
Figure 1. Key Variables Driving Stealth and Sunshine Attitudes.
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paradox premised on the assumed incommensurability of stealth and sunshine view (and 
the irrationality of holding both views simultaneously). For us, there is simply no such 
paradox. Public attitudes are, like politics itself, conditional and complex – and, in mak-
ing sense of the complexity of politics, citizens inevitably draw on a range of pre-formu-
lated vernaculars or dispositional orientations which may, on the face of it, appear 
contradictory. So it is perfectly reasonable for a person to express agreement with propo-
sitions from both sets of ostensibly competing views, with the stealth set of attitudes 
available to be triggered by a negative experience of politics, while the more positive set 
of sunshine attitudes are available to be triggered by a more positive cue. Tests on our 
data using positive and negative triggers for political engagement show the operation of 
precisely such effects (Stoker, 2014).
Finally, we know that question wording, the ordering of questions and the ordering of 
responses can affect survey results (Pastek and Krosnick, 2010). Yet the stealth and sun-
shine items we use are becoming an established part of the range of survey questions 
used within political science. Some may still argue that they prompt certain responses; 
however, we think that the distinct, varied and yet consistent pattern of the responses that 
we and others generate using such survey questions makes that claim implausible. 
Notwithstanding any shortcomings that exist, we would argue that the stealth and sun-
shine survey questions do what all good questionnaires aim to achieve in that they ‘offer 
a window into political attitudes and behaviours that would be impossible to achieve 
through any other research design’ (Pastek and Krosnick, 2010: 11). Choosing to replicate 
the original formulation of the questions is also crucial to achieving the comparability of 
our results with those of the existing literature that we seek.
Following the practice of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), the Stealth 1–4 questions 
were combined in a compound index of the four responses – coded ‘1’ for those respond-
ents giving a positive answer to each of Stealth 1 and 2 questions and to at least one of the 
Stealth 3 and Stealth 4 questions (and coded ‘0’ for any other set of responses).5 The 
production of a dichotomous dependent variable in this way allowed us to deploy binary 
logistic regression modelling techniques to study the influence of a range of independent 
variables. Neblo et al. (2010a) propose a similar procedure for the sunshine questions.
The survey methodology also allowed us to explore the influence of a range of factors 
identified as potentially significant drivers of stealth perspectives in our discussion of 
populism. These were grouped under five headings. First, the survey enabled us to cover 
the standard demographic variables such as gender, age and social class often associated 
with political behaviour. A further set of variables were concerned with interest in, and 
knowledge of, politics. A third set of variables introduced into the analysis sought to cap-
ture the relationship between stealth and expressed attitudes to the system of governing. 
A fourth set of factors sought to capture citizens’ perceived personal efficacy – namely, 
whether they might or could (if they so wished) influence decision-making at local and 
national levels. A fifth set of explanatory variables explored perceptions of the influence 
of the media and evidence on the impact of reported news readership based on distinc-
tions between broadsheet, tabloid and local newspaper readership.6 Finally, the Finnish 
study (Bengtsson and Mattila, 2009) found a strong connection between stealth attitudes 
and a commitment to greater use of direct democracy. To see if a similar effect was pre-
sent among the British sample, we included an additional question formulated in the same 
way (on support for a greater use of referendums).
We accompanied our survey work with 14 focus groups conducted in various locations 
throughout Britain in 2011 and 2012. The focus groups were each facilitated by one 
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member of the research team. They were recorded and subsequently transcribed. The focus 
groups were used to gauge citizens’ understandings of politics, their sense of what was 
wrong or right with its conduct and to explore in more detail the criteria by which such 
judgements were made. Each group concluded with a discussion of potential reforms to the 
political system and what might be done to improve politics and citizens’ experiences of it. 
We then used the ideas emerging from the focus groups to present a series of reform 
options in a survey conducted in Britain in December 2012 by TNS-BMRB. This used 
face-to-face interviews with a representative quota sample of 1128 adults (for more details, 
see Hansard Society, 2013: 103–105).
Despite their limitations, the four stealth and sunshine responses do capture a negative 
populist orientation towards politics on the one hand and a more positive commitment to 
the values and processes of representative democracy on the other. In short, they allow us 
to explore empirically some important matters for understanding the degree and nature of 
citizens’ estrangement from politics in contemporary democracies.
Results: The Connection between Stealth and Populism
Table 1 provides the details of the responses obtained from our British survey. It confirms 
majority support for the first two stealth propositions on the need for more action and less 
talk from politics and the importance of politicians sticking to their stated principles. The 
idea of a greater role in governing by experts or business leaders receives a more balanced 
response with roughly equal numbers agreeing and disagreeing. Subtracting those disa-
greeing from those in agreement reveals more still about the shape of the responses. For 
the ‘talk’ item, the result is +64.7; for the ‘compromise’ item, +38.8; for the ‘experts’ 
item, +1.3; and for the ‘business’ item, −3.9.
Support for the first two items on the stealth list is higher than support on the second 
two, a finding that is matched in other comparative work (Bengtsson and Mattila, 2009; 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002; Neblo et al., 2010a; Webb, 2013). Citizens are bothered 
about politics being ‘all talk and no action’ and ‘too much about compromises’ but are not 
so willing to the same degree to express ‘a broad fondness for nondemocratic decision-
making structures’ (Neblo et al., 2010a: 580). When they do support a greater role for 
business people or experts, this seems to be associated with a clear and palpable frustra-
tion with the job of governing being done by elected politicians (a finding confirmed in 
the focus group data). Stealth, in this light, we would argue is less about being opposed to 
a vision of more expansive democracy and more about a concern and frustration about the 
way democratic politics works. In short, it is about a populist angst.
The heart of the stealth perspective, then, is support for the first two propositions. We 
can judge the depth of that support by following the procedure suggested by Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse – namely, by counting those respondents who support both propositions 
and either one of the last two stealth statements. Three or more stealth democratic traits 
are in the case of our British respondents supported by 35.5 % of respondents. Interestingly, 
the strength of support for such views in Britain is higher than that recorded either by 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) in the United States (27.2 %) or by Bengtsson and 
Mattila (2009) in Finland (25.7 %).
Our argument for the populist character of stealth attitudes is reinforced if we examine 
the correlates and drivers of such a stealth orientation. The dependent variable we use for 
stealth is constructed, as discussed above, by looking at respondents who support three or 
more stealth traits. Table 2 displays the results of an estimated logistic regression 
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Table 1. Responses (%) on Stealth Items in Britain, 2011–2012.
Response STEALTH QUESTIONS
 Politicians 
should stop 
talking and 
take action
Compromise is 
selling out one’s 
principles 
Leave decisions 
to successful 
business 
people
Leave 
decisions to 
non-elected 
experts
 % N % N % N % N
SA 37.6 465 19.6 243 10.0 124 8.9 110
PA 34.0 421 32.3 400 20.8 258 22.4 277
PD 5.3 66 10.8 134 20.2 250 18.0 223
SD 1.6 20 2.3 28 14.5 179 12.0 149
NA/ND 17.3 214 29.4 364 29.7 368 33.1 410
DK 4.2 52 5.6 69 4.8 59 5.6 69
Total 100.0 1238 100.0 1238 100.0 1238 100.0 1238
SA: strongly agree; PA: partly agree; PD: partly disagree; SD: strongly disagree; NA/ND: Neither agree nor 
disagree; DK: Don’t know.
analysis. In terms of demographic factors, and in contrast to the American and Finnish 
samples, in Britain age is a pronounced driver of stealth attitudes for those aged 35–54. 
Support for stealth was also stronger among those aged 55+. Among other significant 
factors driving stealth support are a set of attitudinal tie-ups that fit with our broad desig-
nation of stealth as a populist response to the contingencies of modern politics. Citizens 
who think that the system of governing is working well are roughly half as likely to adopt 
a stealth perspective compared to those who think that the system of governing works less 
well. Another attitudinal response that would appear to fit with a populist framing of 
stealth is that those who express an interest in politics are roughly half as likely to adopt 
a stealth attitude, compared to those who profess no such interest. Yet those citizens who 
support greater use of referendums to decide important questions are at least twice as 
likely to adopt a stealth world view than those who do not support the proposition. Again 
we see a populist framing of stealth views, as frustrated citizens favour a more direct say 
for ‘the people’ in decision-making as a result. These various findings largely confirm our 
view of stealth consciousness as part of a populist vernacular. Stealth attitudes are more 
prominent among older voters, those who are disaffected and turned-off politics and who 
would in their frustration like to see more chance for direct control by citizens.
We are further reinforced in this view by the evidence that connects stealth attitudes to 
reported behaviour, in particular to newspaper readership. By far, the strongest factor 
driving stealth attitudes in the entire analysis is readership of a national tabloid newspa-
per. Within the British sample, respondents are nearly four times as likely to adopt a 
stealth perspective if they read a tabloid newspaper compared to a broadsheet. The effect 
is still quite strong and in the same direction for readers of both a tabloid and a broad-
sheet. Reading a local newspaper, many of which now also take a tabloid form, also 
appears to be a significant driver of stealth attitudes, although the impact is not quite as 
strong as for readership of a national tabloid. But such respondents are still more than 
twice as likely to adopt stealth views compared to a broadsheet reader.
We have clearly demonstrated a correlation between the stealth perspective and news-
paper readership. However, we recognise that the direction of causation is, as ever, a deal 
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Table 2. Parameter Estimates for Logistic Regression Model of Responses on Stealth 
Democracy in Great Britain, 2011–2012 (N = 899).
Determinant Log odds 
ratio
Standard 
error
Wald-
statistic
Df p Odds 
ratio
Constant −2.46*** 0.46 28.24 1 0 0.09
Demographic
 Gender (male: reference)
  Female 0.17 0.16 1.14 1 0.29 1.19
 Age (18–34: reference)
  35–54 0.77*** 0.2 14.62 1 0 2.16
  55+ 0.57** 0.21 7.49 1 0 1.76
 Social class (A or B)
  C1 or C2 0.09 0.22 0.16 1 0.69 1.09
  D or E 0.21 0.24 0.76 1 0.38 1.23
Political interest and knowledge
Likely to vote (no: reference)  
Yes −0.26 0.19 1.83 1 0.18 0.77
Interest (no: reference)  
Yes −0.92*** 0.25 13.44 1 0 0.4
Knowledge (no: reference)  
Yes 0.16 0.22 0.51 1 0.48 1.17
Knowledge of parliament (no: reference)  
Yes 0.14 0.22 0.43 1 0.51 1.15
Attitudes to governing system
Governing system works well  
(no: reference)
 
Yes −0.55*** 0.18 9.63 1 0 0.58
Parliament holds government to account 
(no: reference)
 
Yes 0.50** 0.18 7.7 1 0.01 1.65
Parliament encourages public involvement 
(no: reference)
 
Yes 0.17 0.18 0.92 1 0.34 1.19
Parliament is essential to democracy (no: 
reference)
 
Yes 0.09 0.21 0.2 1 0.66 1.1
Parliament debates matter (no: reference)  
Yes −0.07 0.18 0.14 1 0.71 0.93
Engagement and efficacy
Involvement in politics could change the 
way country run (no: reference)
 
Yes 0.28 0.17 2.67 1 0.1 1.33
Involvement in local community could 
change the way area is run (no: reference)
 
Yes 0.13 0.18 0.54 1 0.46 1.14
Have influence on decision making in 
local area (no: reference)
 
Yes −0.22 0.2 1.24 1 0.27 0.8
(Continued)
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Determinant Log odds 
ratio
Standard 
error
Wald-
statistic
Df p Odds 
ratio
Constant −2.46*** 0.46 28.24 1 0 0.09
Have influence on decision making in the 
country (no: reference)
 
Yes −0.39 0.24 2.67 1 0.1 0.67
Want involvement in decision making in 
local area (no: reference)
 
Yes 0.16 0.23 0.48 1 0.49 1.17
Want involvement in decision making in 
the country (no: reference)
 
Yes 0.31 0.23 1.8 1 0.18 1.36
Media: influence and readership
Media influences how people vote  
(no: reference)
 
Yes −0.24 0.24 0.96 1 0.33 0.79
Media influences the topics politicians 
debate (no: reference)
 
Yes 0.34 0.21 2.66 1 0.1 1.4
Media influences the decisions politicians 
make (no: reference)
 
Yes −0.01 0.19 0 1 0.98 0.99
Print media readership (broadsheet readers only: reference)
 Tabloid readers only 1.30*** 0.26 24.77 1 0 3.68
 Both 0.89*** 0.31 8.22 1 0 2.43
 Local newspaper or other readers only 1.00*** 0.32 9.96 1 0 2.72
 None 0.56* 0.29 3.62 1 0.06 1.75
Greater use of direct democracy
Support more direct democracy  
(no: reference)
 
Yes 0.78*** 0.22 12.85 1 0 2.18
*0.10 > p ⩾ 0.05; **0.05 > p ⩾ 0.01; ***p < 0.01; Df: degrees of freedom; Nagelkerke R square: 0.19;  
−2loglikelihood: 1042.39.
Table 2. (Continued)
more difficult to establish definitively. First, as is widely recognised in the literature (for 
a review, see Street, 2011: 101–118), media effects on politics are difficult to demon-
strate. The evidence is tantalising in the sense that we cannot be sure if those holding 
stealth attitudes favour tabloid newspapers, or, conversely, whether reading tabloid papers 
is driving stealth attitudes. If ever there were a ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem, this is it (see 
also Newton and Brynin, 2001: 265): is it that readers choose newspapers aligned to their 
views or do newspapers by their presentation of the news influence readers’ views? The 
challenge is partly methodological and given access to only one set of survey results, it is 
largely irresoluble. It could be addressed by carefully constructed experiments or through 
the use of time series panel data. But as neither of those options were open to us, we are 
left with the observation that to connect tabloid readership with stealth attitudes goes with 
the grain of the insight emerging from most political communication scholarship (Street, 
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2011). An emphasis on work that argues that media effects are relatively weak and likely 
merely to reinforce existing attitudes has given way to an alternate view that is prepared 
to concede that the media may have more direct and powerful effects on citizens’ views 
and behaviour. Moreover, while much of the early work focussed on the impact on voting 
behaviour, some of the more recent trends have been towards work looking at broader 
impacts and cumulative impacts of the media on citizens’ attitudes (Gavin and Sanders, 
2003; for a more general discussion, see Whiteley, 2011). This work generally tends to the 
view that impacts of a significant scale do occur, at least on specific groups of voters. Our 
study is entirely consistent with such a conclusion.
Our core argument is that stealth attitudes constitute a distinctive type of negativity 
towards politics, reflecting in turn a populist orientation in all contemporary democracies 
created by the tension between the promise of democracy and its more messy delivery. A 
strong stealth orientation is not tied significantly to a perceived sense of powerlessness as 
measured by various efficacy questions. Stealth supporters do want to have more of a say 
through referendums, but we argue that such a stance is consistent with a broader populist 
perspective.
The Limits to Populist Angst: Let the Sunshine in
A stealth orientation exists among a substantial section of British citizens. But, as sug-
gested for the United States by Neblo et al. (2010a), it is also possible to find even larger 
support for a set of more positive propositions about the way that politics works. Table 3 
shows support for the four sunshine propositions we tested. The pattern of support is 
generally greater than that shown for the equivalent items that constitute the test of the 
prevalence of stealth values. The exception is the ‘talk’ item. This achieved 71.6% agree-
ment in its stealth form but only 67.7% in the sunshine form. For the other three items, 
agreement with the sunshine proposition comfortably outstripped that for its stealth 
equivalent. Taking agree responses away from disagrees reveals a strong pattern of sup-
port with the ‘talk’ item at +62.2, the ‘openness’ item at +74.0, the ‘business’ item at +60.1 
and the ‘expert’ item at +59.9.
If we accumulate the sunshine responses in a manner equivalent to that used for stealth 
responses (by selecting those respondents who agree with the first two sunshine state-
ments and at least one of the last two), we get an idea of the depth of support for the 
sunshine perspective. We find that 64% of respondents supported three or more sunshine 
traits. In short, it is clear that sunshine values outstrip stealth values by a large degree in 
the British sample. The lesson to be drawn from these findings appears clear. Populist 
angst about the way politics works exists, but against a background in which other more 
positive folk intuitions about politics persist.
The issue thus becomes, for us, what might trigger disproportionately in citizens an 
understanding of politics and political experience couched more in terms of such positive 
dispositions. How, in other words, might politics be reformed so as to crowd out stealth 
and let the sunshine in?
Neblo et al. (2010a) suggest that more opportunities for deliberation within the system 
of democratic decision-making are the way forward. We think that rather than going for 
one pre-ordained solution, it might be better to explore reform options more widely (and, 
indeed, inductively). After all, our survey found relatively high levels of support for greater 
levels of direct democracy through the use of referendums (72% agreed with the statement 
that ‘important questions should be determined by referendums more often than today’). 
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Table 3. Responses (%) on Sunshine Items in Britain, 2011–2012.
Response SUNSHINE QUESTIONS
Elected politicians 
need to debate 
before making 
decisions 
Openness and 
willingness to 
compromise are 
important to 
politics
Important 
differences exist 
between running a 
government and a 
business
Important for 
elected politicians 
to decide rather 
than leaving it to 
experts
 % N % N % N % N
SA 29.9 364 49.7 604 26.4 321 31.3 380
PA 37.8 460 26.6 324 37.9 461 33.7 410
PD 3.6 44 1.6 20 3.0 36 3.9 48
SD 1.9 23 0.7 8 1.2 14 1.2 15
NA/ND 21.5 261 16.7 203 25.2 306 24.2 294
DK 5.3 64 4.7 57 6.4 78 5.7 69
Total 100.0 1216 100.0 1216 100.0 1216 100.0 1216
SA: strongly agree; PA: partly agree; PD: partly disagree; SD: strongly disagree; NA/ND: Neither agree nor 
disagree; DK: Don’t know.
It also found that strong supporters of stealth and sunshine perspectives were more likely 
to be backers of that option. Rather than assume a priori what might trigger a more positive 
orientation towards politics, we thought it preferable to ask citizens themselves.
Reforming Politics: Citizens’ Preferences
Accordingly, at the end of the focus group sessions, we asked the participants to identify, 
in writing, up to three reform ideas for improving politics, whether mentioned in the prior 
discussion or not. The 153 participants gave us a potential 459 reform ideas. Only a few 
members of the focus groups did not offer three ideas and even fewer offered ideas that 
were difficult to fathom. We gave our focus group participants no steer as to what type of 
reforms they might identify; their task was merely to propose reforms which they felt had 
some credible chance of improving the politics they are currently offered. We received 
450 useable suggestions (these are summarised in Table 4).
As Table 4 shows, the top preference, in terms of reform ideas, was to ensure that those 
who made decisions, especially elected representatives, were open in what they did and 
accountable for their performance. In the discussion in the focus groups, there were many 
occasions when unfavourable comparisons were made between the mechanisms of 
accountability that people found themselves subject to in their own working lives and the 
perceived unaccountability of elected representatives. Similarly, repeated emphasis was 
placed on the perceived basic lack of performance delivery mechanisms available to 
citizens to hold politics in check, or even to account. Another big concern was improving 
communication and ensuring that fair and accessible information about decisions (and 
their underlying rationale) is provided. A further concern was about broadening the social 
base and experience of those standing for office as elected representatives.
In a wider representative sample survey undertaken as part of the Hansard Society’s 
Audit of Political Engagement 2013 (Hansard Society, 2013), we were able to test whether 
the reform options selected by the focus groups were favoured more generally by the 
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Table 5. Reform Preferences for Improving Politics.
Which of the following changes do you think would improve the British political 
system the most? Please pick up to three.
%
Make politics more transparent so that it is easier to follow 48
Make politicians more accountable for their performance between elections 39
Better information and education about politics for all citizens 32
Less ‘spin’ in political communication 26
Give citizens more of a say (e.g. more referendums, more consultation) 29
Get experts more involved in decision-making 17
More positive media coverage of politics 12
Constitutional changes (e.g. an elected House of Lords, a different voting system) 8
More people like me as MPs 6
None of these 11
Source: Data from Hansard Society (2013) Audit of Political Engagement.
public. The results (see Table 5) do indeed show very similar reform preferences among 
citizens in this representative sample to those identified through the focus groups.
Conclusion
Understanding popular negativity towards politics in contemporary democracies is a cru-
cial task, as is diagnosing its causes and potential solutions. Sadly, it remains the case that, 
as political scientists, we understand a lot more about what drives voting behaviour than 
the more elusive topic of how citizens understand and think about democratic politics. 
Yet, without deepening considerably our understanding of how citizens orient themselves 
to the practices of contemporary democracy, it would seem impossible to grasp the sig-
nificance and nature of the challenge posed by negativity towards politics, let alone to 
respond creatively to that challenge in such a way as to address the concerns from which 
it issues. In such a context, the lens provided by the stealth perspective is particularly 
Table 4. Classification of Political Reform Ideas from Citizens.
Reform idea Numbers of mentions (%)
Change processes of politics to make it more accountable 
and to ensure that what is promised is delivered
128 (28)
Better education, information exchange and less spin in 
communication
68 (15)
Give citizens more of a say (especially through referendums) 73 (16)
Deal with issues that are of concern 58 (13)
Improve representativeness and accessibility of MPs 43 (9)
Institutional changes to parliament, constitution reform or 
changes to electoral system
41 (9)
Get more experts involved in decision-making 15 (3)
Create a more positive media environment for politics 13 (3)
Give local communities more of a say 7 (–)
Get politicians to be more normal 4 (–)
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helpful. We have shown that stealth attitudes are prevalent and we have argued that such 
attitudes can and should be seen as the expression of a populist angst about the way poli-
tics works. Many British citizens hold stealth views.
However, we have also shown that there is a popular base for a more positive under-
standing of politics held by an even larger group of citizens. Public opinion can express 
frustration with politics. But equally, it appears that it can just as readily see a way forward 
that is normatively defensible and compatible with the aspirations of many citizens. 
However, judging by the expressed aspirations of citizens themselves, the way forward does 
not appear to be the deliberative participation favoured by many deliberative theorists.
The most popular of the reform approaches chosen by citizens in our study seem to 
match with a stealth populist critique of contemporary political practice rather than a 
strong desire for more deliberative participation (see Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2001a, 
2001b). The top reform ideas that emerge from citizens themselves are all about making 
representative democracy work in practice the way they think it should, such that their 
confidence in politics as a governing process might be restored. The onus of the reform 
trajectory is on a shift in the behaviour of elected representatives in terms of their account-
ability and responsiveness. In addition, what is clear is that the populist negativity dis-
played by citizens may require more effort at promoting a better understanding of politics 
(Flinders, 2012). It is particularly telling here that better information and education about 
politics were high on the list of reform options favoured by citizens.
Designing the mechanisms to produce reforms to convince citizens that such a bringing 
together of aspiration and reality is possible remains a significant challenge. Parliaments 
across established democracies have shown a willingness to undertake some reforms to 
re-connect with citizens (Beetham, 2011) and many of these reforms, on the surface, 
address some of the concerns outlined in Tables 4 and 5. But there are doubts that the 
reforms go far enough. We hope that David Beetham (2011: 140) is right when he suggests 
there are forces at work that will open up the existing processes of representative demo-
cracy to radical change – while also revealing to citizens more of the internal workings of 
the political process in a way that encourages support for the intricate and convoluted 
dynamics of democracy in complex and divided societies.
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Notes
1 For more general reviews of the literature, see Deiwiks (2009) and Akkerman (2003).
2 We substituted the word ‘politician’ for ‘official’ as the term ‘elected official’ is not used so commonly in 
Britain.
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3 The wording used by Neblo et al. (2010a) is slightly different, in that it includes at the end the statement, 
‘in a country as diverse as ours’. This, we reasoned, was more suited to the US context, and might also be 
seen as leading the respondent to acquiescence with the statement to a greater degree than our more neutral 
wording.
4 Again, as in the equivalent stealth question, we used the phrase ‘elected politicians’ in preference to its US 
counterpart, ‘elected officials’.
5 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002: 143–144) offer no direct explanation for this choice but suggest that 
while the first two items capture distinctive features of the stealth perspective, the responses to the 
business and expert involvement questions capture the shared idea that policy-making would be better if 
non-elected independent voices were involved in decision-making rather than professional politicians.
6 The following newspapers – The Sun, Mirror, People, Daily Star, Daily Record, Sunday Mirror, Sunday 
People, Sunday Sport, Daily Express, Daily Mail, Sunday Express and Mail on Sunday – were designated 
as tabloids. The Daily Telegraph, Times, Guardian, Financial Times, Independent, Sunday Telegraph, 
Sunday Times, Observer and Independent on Sunday were similarly designated broadsheets. Sometimes 
a three-fold distinction is drawn between the tabloids, the broadsheets and an additional category of mid-
market papers including the Daily Mail, the Daily Express and their Sunday editions. But for our purposes, 
given our interests in tabloid populism, there is no case for making such a distinction.
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